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Abstract Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are a kind of wireless ad hoc net-
works that are multi-hop where packets are forwarded from source to destination
by intermediate notes as well as routers that form a kind of network infrastructure
backbone. We investigate the security of the recently proposed rst known secure
authentication and billing architecture for WMNs which eliminates the need for
bilateral roaming agreements and that for traditional home-foreign domains. We
show that this architecture does not securely provide incontestable billing contrary
to designer claims and furthermore it does not achieve entity authentication. We
then present an enhanced scheme that achieves entity authentication and nonre-
pudiable billing.
Keywords Mobile ad hoc networks, mesh networks, security, authentication,
billing, non-repudiation, cheating
1 Introduction
UPASS [23] is the rst known authentication and billing architecture for wireless
mesh networks (WMN) [2,3,13,16,18,22,23,26] that is claimed to provide entity
authentication and incontestable billing. The main idea is to motivate potentially
selsh intermediate users and routers to forward packets within multi-hop wireless
networks by rewarding them with incentives [24].
Rewarding packet forwarders positively instead of penalizing those that do not
forward is a good economic approach. Certainly, parties respond more enthusi-
astically to positive encouragement rather than negative compulsion. Therefore,
the billing mechanism needs to function properly and in this sense its incon-
testable (also known as nonrepudiation) property cannot be awed. Otherwise,
well-behaving packet forwarders might not be rewarded and/or misbehaving nodes
could frame innocent ones to cause the latter to be billed extra.
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In this paper, we rst present our security analysis results of the authentication
and billing schemes of UPASS, showing that they do not achieve entity authenti-
cation and nonrepudiation. These are the rst known security analysis results on
UPASS. In doing so, we discuss the reasons behind the cause of these problems.
We then present enhanced nonrepudiable authentication and billing schemes that
overcome these security problems.
2 Preliminaries
UPASS makes use of identity-based cryptography that is constructed from bilinear
pairings over elliptic curves. Let p and q be two large primes and E=Zp denote the
elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax + b over Zp. Let G1 denote a subgroup of order q
of the additive group of points on E=Zp, and G2 denote a subgroup of order q
of the multiplicative group of the nite eld Fp2 . A pairing is dened as a map
e^ : G1 G1 ! G2 satisfying the following:
{ Bilinear: For all P;Q 2 G1 and all a; b 2 Zq , we have that
e^(aP; bQ) = e^(aP;Q)b = e^(P; bQ)a = e^(P;Q)ab
{ Non-degenerate: If P is a generator of G1, then e^(P; P ) is therefore a generator
of G2.
{ Computable: There is an ecient algorithm to compute e^(P;Q) for all P;Q 2
G1.
Some other notations required for the rest of this paper are as follows. hk(m)
denotes a message authentication code (MAC) of message m under key k, Epk(m)
denotes ID-based encryption of m under public key pk, Ssk(m) denotes ID-based
signature of m under private key sk.
2.1 Known Types of Attacks on Authentication and Key Establishment Schemes
The basic requirements of Authentication [12,19{21] and/or Key Establishment
[25] (AKE) schemes can be found in literature, e.g. [17,5]. In particular, they
include the following.
{ Entity authentication (EA): Each party is assured of the identity of the other
party involved in a protocol and that the latter has actually participated.
{ Key-indistinguishability (IND): An adversary should not be able to obtain
even one bit of information about the secret key established by a key estab-
lishment scheme.
{ Unknown key-share attack (UKS) resilience: UKS is an attack where a
party A believes that he shares a key with another party B upon completion
of a protocol run (this is in fact the case), but B falsely believes that the key is
instead shared with a party E 6= A. A basic AKE protocol should be resilient
to this.
{ Perfect forward secrecy (PFS): If long-term private keys or master secrets of
any party are compromised, the secrecy of previously established session keys
should not be aected. This is an attempt to still oer some form of security
guarantee in spite of the fact that the long-term secret has been leaked.
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{ Key-compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience: The compromise of any
party's long-term private key or master secret should not enable the adversary
to impersonate any other parties.
{ Key control (KC) resilience: No party should be able to control or predict
the value (or even some bits) of the established key.
It is important for a security protocol, as is the UPASS protocol, to be secure at
least against known types of attacks [7,10,11] including those listed above.
In this paper, we show unfortunately that for the UPASS protocol, it is suscep-
tible to unknown key share (UKS) attacks [11,7], and furthermore, is contestable.
3 Authentication and Billing Architecture for WMNs: UPASS
UPASS is an architecture for authentication and billing for WMNs, proposed
by Zhang and Fang [23]. It is based on the usage of identity-based cryptogra-
phy. UPASS is designed to achieve entity authentication and incontestable (non-
repudiable) billing.
Rather than being based on the notion of requiring users to register with a
home network and then having foreign networks contact the home network when
the user requires access while roaming away from home, UPASS is based on the
credit card model, i.e. there exists brokers analogous to banks to which both users
and WMN access providers (also known as operators) register and have long-term
relationships with. When a user accesses the network within the domain of a WMN
operator, the user pays by way of tokens which the operator uses to contact the
broker to claim payment for the amount of user access corresponding to the tokens,
and the broker then charges the user in order to pay to the operator. Note therefore
that unlike the relationship with the broker which is long term, the relationship
between user and operator is short term and on a per session basis, i.e. analogous
to a customer visiting a supermarket.
3.1 Trust Setup
Within the UPASS architecture, the wireless mesh network is divided into trust
domains, each of which is managed by a WMN operator or a broker. Setup consists
of the following steps:
1. Generate parameters hp; q;E=Zp;G1;G2; e^i.
2. Choose an arbitrary generator P of G1.
3. Choose a cryptographic hash function H1 that maps arbitrary-length strings
to non-zero elements in G1.
4. Choose a random  2 Zq to be the domain-master-secret and generate a public
domain-public-key from this by Ppub = P .
Each router (respectively user) in the WMN domain is assumed to be uniquely
identiable by a network access identier R-NAI (respectively U-NAI) obtained
from his enrolled broker.
Before deployment, a WMN operator supplies each of its mesh routers within
its domain with a router pass R-pass = hR-NAI, expiry-datei which forms a
timestamped ID of the router and a pass-based key R-key = H1(R-pass) where
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 is the operator's domain-master-secret. R-pass is made public but R-key is kept
secret and known only to the operator and its router.
Meanwhile, for the WMN user, at the point of registration with a broker (anal-
ogous to a bank in the real world), the broker than issues a user pass to the user,
dened as U-pass = hU-NAI, expiry-date, otherTermsi where otherTerms is used
to specify any instance-specic terms and conditions of the user registration. The
broker also issues a pass-based user key U-key = H1(U-pass), where  is the
broker's domain-master-secret. U-pass is made public but U-key is kept secret by
the user.
3.2 Entity Authentication
The entity authentication phase between user and WMN operator's router, and
between any two users, are described in this section.
Inter-domain User-Router Authentication (URA). The inter-domain authen-
tication between user and router needs to occur when a user migrates to another
WMN domain from its current domain.
Consider a user U1 having the key pair hU1-pass; U1-keyi and router R1 having
hR1-pass; R1-keyi. A three-way mutual authentication protocol then follows:
1. R1 !  : R1-pass, SR1-key(t1)
2. U1 ! R1 : U1-pass, SU1-key(t2)
3. R1 ! U1 : ^U1-pass, EU1-pass(U^1-key)
More precisely, U1 wanders into a new domain and encounters a beacon message
broadcast by router R1. This is indicated above as message (1.). This beacon
message includes the router's R1-pass as well as access fee rates and an R1-signed
timestamp t1 to prevent replay attacks. U1 then performs the following:
i. Check if t1 is fresh.
ii. Check that R1-pass is still valid, via its expiry-date element.
iii. Verify the signature SR1-key(t1) by using R1-pass.
U1 then sends message (2.) which includes its own U1-pass and its signature of a
timestamp t2. R1 then performs similar steps as (i.) to (iii.) as above. R1 contacts
the domain operator for a temporary key pair for U1 dened as
^U1-pass = hU^1-NAI; expiry-datei
U^1-key = H1( ^U1-pass)
R1 sends message (3.) to U1 including the temporary public key ^U1-pass and the
encryption of the temporary private key U^1-key. U1 decrypts this to obtain U^1-key
and checks if the following holds:
e^(U^1-key; P ) = e^(H1( ^U1-pass); Ppub):
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U1 stores this temporary key pair for its use within the WMN domain that it
just joined. Note that upon completion of this protocol, both U1 and R1 have also
implicitly established a shared secret key
KR1;U1 = e^(R1-key; H1( ^U1-pass))
= e^(H1(R1-pass);H1( ^U1-pass))
= e^(H1( ^U1-pass); H1(R1-pass))
= e^(U^1-key; H1(R1-pass))
= KU1;R1 :
Intra-Domain User-User Authentication (UUA). Within the same mesh in
a WMN domain, the authentication between users is needed since only packets
from legitimate users should be forwarded by other users, otherwise the latter
forwarding users are not assured to get any incentives for forwarding packets.
The UPASS architecture denes that this kind of authentication be based
on the temporary key-pair hU^-pass; U^-keyi. Note that possession of this key-pair
already implies that the user U has been successfully authenticated against a
WMN router of the current domain. Let U1 and U2 denote the two users wishing
to run the user-user authentication protocol. User U1 (respectively U2) sends its
pass ^U1-pass (respectively ^U2-pass) to each other. Using the received pass of the
other user, they can then generate the shared secret key as
KU1;U2 = e^(H1( ^U1-pass); H1( ^U2-pass))
:
This shared key can then be subsequently used for authenticating each other, e.g.
U1 sends to U2 a random challenge r1 encrypted with KU1;U2 to which U2 responds
with the encryption of r1 + 1 under the same shared key.
3.3 Incontestable Billing
Once mutual authentication is achieved, and the user accesses the network, the
operator can then charge the user for its accesses via a session-based billing scheme
of UPASS that is claimed to be incontestable (nonrepudiable).
A payment structure is used, dened as follows:
hSU1-key(DU1!R1); hami; hw1;ti; hw2;ti; : : : ; hwm;tii;
where we dene
DU1!R1 = hR1-NAI; expiry-date; L; a1; t;mi
and L represents the monetary worth of each token to be used in the scheme
for payment while t and m respectively denote the parameters that dene the
length of the payment chains hwi;ti and proof chain hami to be dened in ensuing
paragraphs.
hami denotes the chain of m hash values faij1  i  mg generated as
ai = h(ai+1);
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where h() is a cryptographic hash function, starting from the initial random root
am and proceeding through index i in descending order, i.e. i = m down to i = 1.
The nice property of such a hash chain is that given ai 1 it is computationally
infeasible to derive ai although computing in opposite direction, i.e. deriving ai
from ai 1 is ecient. For the context of this billing scheme, this hash chain hami
is called a proof chain.
Similarly, hwi;ti denotes the chain of t hash values fwi;j j1  j  tg generated
as
wi;j = h(wi;j+1);
derived from the initial random root wi;t. This hash chain hwi;ti is called a payment
chain.
SU1-key(DU1!R1) denotes U1's signed commitment on his intention to pay to
R1, and this needs to be sent to R1 before any session starts. R1 veries this with
U1-pass and saves it in order to verify subsequent payments from U1.
For U1 to start paying for its network accesses by using tokens, recall that
the payment commitment SU1-key(DU1!R1) structure DU1!R1 sent from U1 to R1
contains the element a1. This can be used as a proof token to verify the authenticity
of its corresponding payment chain hw1;ti. In more detail, in order for U1 to spend
the payment tokens fw1;j j1  j  tg of hw1;ti, U1 sends hw1;1; ha1(w1;1)i to R1. a1
is viewed as a one-time password of U1 for this particular payment chain hw1;ti,
and in this sense ha1(w1;1) is a message authentication code (MAC) on the value
of w1;1. If R1 successfully veries hw1;1; ha1(w1;1)i, it knows that w1;1 is authentic
and saves it for later verication of other subsequent payment tokens w1;j (for
j = 2; : : : ; t) by checking the relation
w1;j 1 = h(w1;j)
starting from w1;1. When U1 has used up all the payment tokens of the payment
chain hw1;ti, it moves on to have the next payment chain hwi;ti (for i = 2; : : : ;m)
authenticated by sending hai; wi;1; hai(wi;1)i (for i = 2; : : : ;m) to R1. As like before,
R1 checks if ai 1 = h(ai), and then uses ai to verify the authenticity of wi;1 via
hai().
The router stores a payment record for a user Ui as follows:
hSU1-key(DU1!R1); ak; fwi;1; hai(wi;1); wi;ki ; kij1  i  kgi
where ak (1  k  m) denotes the highest-indexed proof token and wi;ki (1  ki 
t) denotes the highest-indexed payment token from hwi;ti.
When R1 wishes to redeem the users' payments, it reports all stored payment
records to the WMN domain operator who then contacts a broker. The steps to
be conducted by the broker would be:
1. Verify SU1-key(DU1!R1), including to verify the user's signature, and that it
has not expired.
2. Verify that a1 = h
k 1(ak) and store the intermediate values ak 1; : : : ; a2.
3. Compute hai(wi;1) (for i = 1; : : : ; k).
4. Verify that wi;1 = h
ki 1(wi;ki) for (i = 1; : : : ; k), and credit the operator's
account with ki number of L-valued monetary units if this is satised.
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4 Cryptanalysis of UPASS
In this section, we present the results of our analysis of UPASS' security, in par-
ticular relevant to its claims of entity authentication and incontestable billing. We
treat each one in turn.
4.1 Inter-Domain User-Router Authentication (URA) Scheme
Unknown Key Share Attacks. Message (2.) of the inter-domain user-router au-
thentication (URA) scheme, i.e. hU1-pass; SU1-key(t2)i indicates only the originator
i.e. U1 but does not indicate the intended recipient i.e. R1. This makes it suscep-
tible to a typical man-in-the-middle attack known as unknown key share (UKS)
attack [11,7] that breaks the security goal of entity authentication. Such an at-
tack is known to apply to the conventional Die-Hellman (DH) key establishment
protocol and thus recent advanced DH protocol are designed to resist this kind of
attack.
In more detail, a UKS attack on URA proceeds as follows:
1. U1 upon seeing message (1.) broadcast from router R1, replies with message
(2.). This is intercepted by the adversary who instead channels it to another
router R2.
2. R2 therefore thinks U1 intends to authenticate with it, and replies with message
(3.) to U1.
Therefore, U1 ends up thinking it has authenticated itself to R1 when in fact it is
authenticated with R2. The implicitly established shared key is also between U1
and R2 instead of U1 and R1.
A more devastating UKS attack on URA can be mounted as follows:
1. U1 on seeing message (1.) responds with message (2.) to R1 as per normal
operational run of the URA protocol.
2. When R1 responds with message (3.) i.e. h ^U1-pass; EU1-pass(U^1-key)i to U1, this
is intercepted by the adversary U2 and replaced with h ^U2-pass; EU1-pass(U^2-key)i,
where U^2-key is known to the adversary U2. Thus, the established shared key
computed by U1 becomes
K0U1;R1 = e^(R1-key;H1( ^U2-pass))
= e^(H1(R1-pass); H1( ^U2-pass))
= e^(H1( ^U2-pass); H1(R1-pass))
= e^(U^2-key; H1(R1-pass))
= KR1;U2 :
Thus, U1 ends up computing a shared key which it thinks is shared with R1 but
instead is shared with the adversary U2. What is worse, the adversary U2 can even
compute the shared key K0U1;R1 , and therefore take part in subsequent communi-
cations with U1 while U1 thinks it is communicating with R1.
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Remark on Key Control. Note that as a side remark, URA is not resilient to
key control, i.e. a generated key (in this case the user U 's temporary key pair)
is not jointly established by all involved parties (in this case the router and the
user U), but is rather generated altogether by the router's domain operator. This is
undesirable [17] within the general context of authentication and key establishment
protocols, and is so in the current case where only the broker is fully trusted
whereas the user and router (and its operator) do not trust each other [23].
4.2 Intra-Domain User-User Authentication (UUA) Scheme
Unknown Key Share Attacks. UUA is susceptible to the same kind of unknown
key share attacks as URA. The reason is that two users wishing to authenticate
each other simply exchange their U-pass without integrity protection nor entity
authentication. As details of the attacks are similar to those on URA in the pre-
ceeding subsection, we omit the description here.
Remark on Privacy. Note that UUA makes use of the temporary key pair
hU^-pass; U^-keyi generated during the URA stage. Nevertheless, this temporary
key pair is generated by the operator. Thus, since the temporary key pair is used
to derive the UUA shared key, therefore besides the two involved users U1 and
U2, in fact the operator is also able to derive the key. This may not be desirable
with respect to privacy since even third party key exchange servers are typically
assumed to be honest but curious [1].
Considering the current UPASS setting where users do not trust the operator
[23], it is desired that the operator should not know the key that is established
between any pair of users. The motivation for the adversarial operator in mounting
this attack is as follows. The operator impersonates the user (client) so that the
user client gets charged for accesses due to the impersonating operator, and so the
operator benets from this since charges go into rewarding the forwarding users
and towards paying the operator.
4.3 Incontestable Billing Scheme
In the security analysis section of UPASS' billing scheme, the designers considered
how the scheme prevents from cheating users and/or cheating operators, basically
in terms of users who access the network but not paying later, and operators who
get paid but not really delivering on the services paid for. In these situations, the
cheatings are incontestable, i.e. the culprit (user or operator) cannot deny that
they cheated, and so culprits can be penalized by various means e.g. legal court
actions.
We highlight here a more devastating form of cheating on UPASS' billing
scheme, where the actual cheating act is repudiable (contestable), i.e. the cul-
prit can deny being involved, and so one cannot then proceed to take the matter
to court for any legal actions.
Cheating the User. Consider the billing scheme of UPASS. The router R1 gets
a copy of a1 (the initial proof token) from the user U1, and in similar fashion the
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other subsequent ai (2  i  m) at some later time. Note that this value is used
to compute the MAC ha1() (subsequently hai()) for verifying the authenticity of
the payment token w1;1 (subsequently wi;1). Thus, a router can use the same ai
(1  i  m) to forge the MAC hai() such that a dierent w0i;1 is used instead of
wi;1. The gist is that this w
0
i;1 is generated by the router in typical iterated hash
chain fashion from a root w0i;t that is known to (or in fact arbitrarily chosen by)
the router, to satisfy the relation
wi;j 1 = h(wi;j); j = 2; : : : ; t:
In this way, since the router knows all the values of this hw0i;ti payment chain, it
can replace the user-intended payment chain hwi;ti with its own generated hw0i;ti
and thereby claim all t payments even if the user only accessed once and paid only
one payment token wi;1.
Indeed, this attack demonstrates the aw in using symmetric cryptography,
as is the case for the MAC hai(), for achieving the incontestability claimed by
UPASS' billing scheme. MACs use the same secret key for generation and verica-
tion, thus in the current case in addition to the user, the verier (router) also [8]
gets hold of the MAC generation key and hence nonrepudiation (incontestability)
cannot hold.
5 Enhanced Schemes for Entity Authentication and Nonrepudiation
In this section, we describe enhancements to the authentication and billing schemes
such that they properly provide entity authentication and nonrepudiation.
5.1 Entity Authentication
As discussed in Section 4, the major problem with the entity authentication phase
of UPASS is the susceptibility to unknown key share attacks since it is only explicit
what the identity of the sender is. Thus, an enhanced inter-domain user-router
authentication (URA) can be described as follows:
1. R1 !  : R1-pass, SR1-key(t1)
2. U1 ! R1 : U1-pass, SU1-key(t2; R1-pass)
3. R1 ! U1 : ^U1-pass, EU1-pass(U^1-key),
SR1-key( ^U1-pass; t2)
Message (2.) indicates not just the identity of the sender U1 via its signature,
but also explicitly [6] indicates U1's intended recipient via the inclusion of R1-
pass in the signature. The signature by R1 in message (3.) allows U1 to verify the
authenticity of the temporary public key ^U1-pass as well as know this is not a
replay.
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5.2 Nonrepudiable Billing
Recall that the payment structure used in the billing scheme is as follows:
hSU1-key(DU1!R1); hami; hw1;ti; hw2;ti; : : : ; hwm;tii:
In our enhanced billing scheme, we redene the structure in the signature SU1-key(DU1!R1)
from U1 to R1 as follows:
DU1!R1 =
hR1-NAI; expiry-date; L; a1; t;m; h2(w1;t); : : : ; h2(wm;t)i;
where h2() is some cryptographic hash function. The rest of the billing scheme
proceeds as normal, as per the description in section 3.3.
The starting point here is to recall that MACs alone do not provide any
non-repudiation [8]. In contrast, the above suggestion to include the roots wi;t
(1  i  m) of the payment chains hwi;ti (1  i  m) in U1's signature commits
these roots as the actual values used to generate the payment chains, and therefore
are nonrepudiable, i.e. U1 cannot later deny having used them as payment tokens.
Furthermore, a router cannot replace them during the payment stage with pay-
ment tokens of its choice and thus cannot frame innocent users for making extra
payments which had not been made, so cheating is prevented.
6 Conclusion
We have presented our results of the security analysis of an authentication and
billing architecture for wireless mesh networks. It is vital that the security of
authentication and billing schemes in literature are analyzed because the only way
the public can have faith to use them is if they are assured that the security is sound
after having been put through considerable amount of analysis. They would want
to be assured that they are only billed for the accesses they had actually made,
and that they will denitely be rewarded if they had forwarded packets of other
users. Furthermore, in the current setting of mesh networks, user nodes will not
be willing to depend on other nodes to forward packets nor willing to themselves
forward the packets if there are doubts in the billing scheme especially with respect
to nonrepudiation. If the latter occurs, the basic functionality of wireless mesh
networks would cease to work. To that end, we proposed enhanced authentication
and billing schemes that oer entity authentication and nonrepudiation.
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